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Abstract
This paper develops a quantitative model that can rationally explain a size-
able part of the dramatic rise and fall of house prices in the 2000-2009 period.
The model is driven by the assumption that the government cannot resist bail-
ing out large financial institutions, but can mitigate the consequences by lim-
iting financial institutions’ risk-taking. An episode of regulatory forbearance,
modeled as a relaxation of loan-to-value limits for conforming mortgages, is
welfare-reducing, results in opportunistic behavior and, for plausible param-
eters inflates house prices and price/rent ratios by roughly twenty percent.
This “boom” is followed by a collapse with high default rates.
The housing boom and bust cycle of the 2000s continues to attract a wide
range of explanations. As is well known, inflation-adjusted house prices rose,
depending on the the price index, some 60 to 100 percent between 1998 and
2007, and then by 2010 in the wake of the financial crisis and recession fell back
nearly to 1998 levels. (See Figure 1.1) The ratio of prices to rents also reached
unprecedented heights during the boom, 35 to 45 percent above other cyclical
peaks, before falling back to more typical levels after the crisis. (See Figure 2.)
While some portion of the rise can be attributed to macroeconomic factors such
as income growth and low interest rates, the magnitude of the boom appears to
have gone far beyond what standard fundamentals can explain.
Much of the attention of researchers has focused on credit markets as the
source of volatility. The literature suggests that obtaining transmission from fi-
nancial frictions into house prices or requires some nonstandard assumptions. As
examples, Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo
(2011), and Boz and Mendoza (2014) incorporate heterogeneous beliefs or other
departures from rational expectations. Other authors, e.g. Favilukis, Ludvigson,
and Nieuwerburgh (2010), obtain price effects by alternately impose or relaxing
exogenous changes in credit limits for which there is no clear rationale to begin
with. Still others, e.g. Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013), Corbae and Quintin
(2015), limit their analysis to credit outcomes and treat house prices as exoge-
nous. Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015) have endogenous house prices, but only
model the decline in prices following an exogenous increase in the stock, together
with exogenous increases in financial frictions.
The heterogeneous beliefs models face the question of testability, since they
rely on unobservable variation in beliefs. Models that incorporate exogenous re-
ductions borrowing limits to explain the boom shares with other work along these
lines (such as Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), Kocherlakota (2009)) the peculiar
feature that the “bubble” or boom is welfare-improving. If a borrowing limit is
just exogenously imposed (as opposed to being motivated by some other market
failure), eliminating it tends to make agents better off by increasing their options.2
1The figure is based on the S&P Shiller index that shows a nearly 100 percent increase. Other
measures, such as the FHFA House Price Indexes, indicate a roughly 60 percent real increase over
the period.
2Moreover, there remains a question (see Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and Nikolov (2011)) whether
the transmission of time-varying frictions into house prices is robust to the presence of a viable
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By contrast, we provide a quantitative model in which binding credit con-
straints are a welfare-improving response to the government’s presumed inability
to pre-commit to allow large financial institutions fail. In our baseline case, the
combination of the credit limit and the pre-commitment problem results in a be-
nign outcome, with house prices close to fundamentals and low default rates on
mortgages. A relaxation of the credit standards (modeled as the eligibility require-
ments for mortgage to be repurchased and guaranteed by a government-sponsored
enterprise such as Fannie Mae) then results in a distortion of house prices above
fundamentals.
In addition, our model maintains standard assumptions that beliefs are ratio-
nal and homogeneous. In our setting, house prices are bid up as a consequence
of increased leverage coupled with a system of guarantees or implicit promises
of bailouts. That system, the intent of which is to support home ownership by
subsidizing borrowers, gives rise to an ever-present incentive toward excessive
leverage, as borrowers and lenders do not face the full consequences of higher de-
fault risk. Normally that incentive is blunted by strict limits on leverage as well as
scrutiny of borrowers to weed out bad risks, and the result is a system that indeed
supports expansive borrowing with little impact on either defaults or house prices.
With that benign outcome as a baseline, we then examine the impact of re-
laxing the limits on borrowing. Again, why this regulatory forbearance occurred
is something we do not model explicitly. There is substantial evidence that it did
occur, however. There are documented increases in loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, as
well as the apparently increased disregard for other characteristics of borrowers
(see Demyanyk and Hemert (2011), for example). In fact, a large number of mort-
gages in the period leading up to the crisis had combined LTVs (including second
mortgages, home equity loans, etc.) of 100 percent.
While aspects of this story are not new, this is the first effort we are aware of
to quantify the impact on house prices, leverage, and default rates in a calibrated
general equilibrium model. To do this we have to make certain restrictions for
tractability, (though we believe the model could be extended to relax these as-
sumptions without significant impact to the main results): We consider a fixed
rental market. Provided credit is not a major constraint on potential landlords, and renting is not
subject to the same frictions, it seems likely that credit constraints would affect ownership rates
more directly than prices.
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stock of housing, i.e. we rule out construction. We have a perfect foresight model
without aggregate shocks in which the only actual risk is idiosyncratic. Even so
we are able to realistically make the government’s intervention contingent on ag-
gregate defaults. In this regard the paper differs from Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman
(2013), who only compare across steady states. They also effectively fix the price
of housing (by having a linear transformation between housing and non-housing
consumption) and focus on default risk. We endogenize house prices by fixing the
stock but, like Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013), impose discipline by having
realistic default rates and default costs in our baseline.
1 Background: Government-Sponsored Enterprises and Mort-
gage Lending
A complete history of government involvement in mortgage lending is beyond the
scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that since the Great Depression, the gov-
ernment has had a major role in making mortgages more widely available and
affordable to borrowers, and more liquid for lenders. The primary mechanisms
have been the purchasing, insuring, and securitizing of mortgages. These efforts
were successful in greatly expanding mortgage loans and, arguably, home owner-
ship. For most of this period, through the mid-1980s, government agencies such
as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and government-sponsored enter-
prises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae, confined their involvement to loans that met
relatively strict and objective standards for quality. The FHA, which insured pri-
vate mortgages, was in principle self-financing, i.e. the insurance premiums were
set to price default risk accurately.
Beginning with the Fair Housing Act of 1968, policy began to focus on ex-
panding the availability of credit to those who had previously found it difficult to
obtain, first by outlawing discrimination, but then by encouraging the extension
of credit to riskier pools of borrowers. During this same period, Fannie Mae was
privatized (though it was widely perceived to have implicit government backing),
and was allowed to purchase private non-insured mortgages (as opposed to those
insured by the FHA or other government agencies). By the 1990s, the GSEs were
required to meet “affordable housing” goals, meaning targets for mortgages of
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low-income homeowners. These goals became more ambitious by the late 1990s,
with private lenders also getting into the act with “subprime” and other loans that
did not conform to GSE standards. Ultimately these markets grew enormously,
and lenders, both government and private, took on more risk and became highly
vulnerable to an economic downturn.
Nonetheless there is considerable debate over the extent to which the implicit
government backing of the GSEs, as well as the “too big to fail” nature of the
largest private financial institutions, contributed to this process and ultimately to
the magnitude of the crisis that developed in 2008. Some have argued, for exam-
ple, that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac “were victims, not culprits,” pointing out
that these agencies did not originate subprime loans, and in fact their share of
mortgage originations dropped in 2003-2006.3 Krugman4 writes, moreover, that
“Fannie and Freddie didn’t do any subprime lending, because they can’t: the defi-
nition of a subprime loan is precisely a loan that doesn’t meet the requirement[s]”
imposed on the agencies.
This sanguine view of the GSEs disregards several important facts—facts not
disputed but minimized by these writers. First, as Krugman acknowledges, the
GSEs were undercapitalized. The impact of that is to make them more profitable,
but with greater solvency risk for a given portfolio of mortgages. Second, Press-
man concedes that “Fannie and Freddie purchased billions of dollars of subprime-
backed securities for their own investment portfolios.” He fails to recognize that
this is tantamount to holding subprime mortgages, and given the size of these in-
stitutions, to helping support that market. In addition, while the GSEs historically
had been constrained to limit their purchases to mortgages with no more than
80 percent LTV and a maximum dollar amount (in 2006 the limit was $417,000,
and $625,500 in designated “high-cost” areas), they did expand lending to riskier
pools of buyers. According to Doris Dungey5 of the “Calculated Risk” blog:
Fannie and Freddie had about as much to with the “explosion of
high-risk lending” as they could get away with...[T]hey pushed the
envelope on credit quality as far as they could inside the constraints
3See Pressman, “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were victims, not culprits” Business Week, Septem-
ber 26, 2008.
4New York Times, July 14, 2008.
5A.k.a. “Tanta.” See http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2008/07/krugman-on-gses.html
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of their charter: they got into “near prime” programs (Fannie’s “Ex-
panded Approval,” Freddie’s “A Minus”) that, at the bottom tier, were
hard to distinguish from regular old “subprime” except—again—that
they were overwhelmingly fixed-rate “non-toxic” loan structures. They
got into “documentation relief” in a big way through their automated
underwriting systems, offering “low doc” loans that had a few key dif-
ferences from the really wretched “stated” and “NINA” crap of the last
several years, but occasionally the line between the two was rather
thin.
In fact, as mentioned above, this effort on the part of Fannie Mae to expand credit
to previously ineligible borrowers dates back to the late 1990s.6 Figures 3 and 4
depict the GSE’s increased involvement in high-LTV mortgages and private-label
securitizations that (along with other risks and high leverage) ultimately put their
solvency in jeopardy. Whether this was due to pressure from HUD to reach “ex-
panded affordability” goals, or was driven by the GSE’s own quest for profit, is not
important for our story.
Acharya et al. (2011) support this, pinpointing the origin of the problem to the
ironically-named Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act
(FHEFSSA), somewhat reluctantly signed into law by President George H.W. Bush
in 1992. The intent of the legislation had been to restrain the GSEs, but political
compromises led to its containing a major Trojan horse: “mission goals” to sup-
port housing and mortgages for “underserved areas.” In addition, the newly cre-
ated regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), was
placed in the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) rather than
a more politically independent entity such as the Federal Reserve. The presence
of these goals facilitated massive growth of low-quality mortgages, both through
the increased ability of the GSEs to repurchase them as well as the participation of
arguably too-big-to-fail so-called “large complex financial institutions” (LCFIs).7
6See “Fannie Mae Eases Credit To Aid Mortgage Lending,” New York Times, September 30, 1999.
7The 14 LCFIs were considered to be, according to Acharya et al. (2011), Citigroup, Bank of
America, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, AIG, Goldman Sachs, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, Wachovia, Lehman Brothers, and Wells Fargo. Arguably 11 of the 14 were at risk
of failure at some point in 2008, and all but one of those eleven were either bailed out by the
governnment or folded into one of the three relatively healthy institutions (Bank of America, Wells
Fargo, and JP Morgan). Lehman, of course, was the unique case of an LCFI that was allowed to
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Finally, the GSEs facilitated the growth of major subprime lenders. Again from
Doris Dungey:
GSEs were major culprits in the growth of the mega-lenders. Over
the years they were struggling so hard to maintain market share, they
were allowing themselves to experience huge concentration risks. As
they catered more and more to their “major partners”—Countrywide,
Wells Fargo, WaMu, the usual suspects—they helped sustain and worsen
the “aggregator” model in which smaller lenders sold loans not to the
GSEs but to [Countrywide or Wells Fargo], who then sold the loans to
the GSEs.
The GSEs, armed with what was widely viewed as government government back-
ing, thus likely played a role in the expansion of credit that was much larger than
their direct role in subprime lending, which was officially negligible at least un-
til the last few years of the boom.8 In addition, many private lenders either saw
themselves as too big to fail (i.e. subject to government bailouts) or as being able
to sell low quality mortgages to investors up a food chain that was ultimately being
supported by the government.
There are of course many other aspects to the financial crisis, notably the errors
of rating agencies and private mortgage insurers, and, related, apparent misper-
ceptions of the risk of aggregate declines in house prices. Our focus on the role
of government is not intended to belittle the role these other factors played. The
goal of the paper is simply to quantify what we believe to be an important con-
tributor to the boom and bust. In particular, the model does not rely critically on
the role of the GSEs; large private financial institutions, provided they have some
expectation of being bailed out in a crisis, could play the same role.
In the next several sections, we formalize some of these ideas in a general
equilibrium model of housing, mortgage markets, and “too-big-to-fail”, that fea-
tures households, a representative firm, financial intermediaries, and government
as leading actors.
fail.
8In 2007 Fannie Mae increased its direct involvement in subprime. See “Fannie’s Perilous Pur-
suit of Subprime Loans,” The Washington Post, August 19, 2008.
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2 A Dynamic Model with Heterogeneous Agents
Our ultimate goal is to assess the consequences of a policy change, specifically
a change in conforming loan limits. For our purposes, “conforming” refers to a
mortgage that qualifies for purchase or securitization by GSEs, and consequently
for any favorable treatment or subsidy via government policy. We will begin with
a description of stationary competitive equilibrium, and later build a dynamic
analysis on this foundation.
Time t ∈ {0, 1, ...} is discrete. There is a continuum of households of measure
1, and a large number N¯  1 of potential entrants/competitors in the financial
sector. A competitive representative firm produces consumption and capital goods.
The housing stock of the economy is in fixed supply, equal to 1, and there is no
explicit rental market for housing.9 There is a government that taxes household
labor income, and uses the proceeds to finance mortgage guarantees whenever
necessary. In what follows, we suppress individual subscripts, but in general, all
quantities vary across agents.
2.1 Households
Households derive utility from consumption ct and housing services ht+1, discount-
ing the future at rate β ∈ (0, 1). The preferences over consumption goods and
housing services are represented by the utility function
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, ht+1). (1)
Housing services at time t are produced by a linear technology that uses the stock
of housing the household owns. With some abuse of notation, we use ht+1 to
denote both. The price of consumption is normalized to 1, and the price of housing
at date t is Pt. It will be clear that income does not affect default decisions in
our framework; therefore we simplify the analysis by assuming identical labor
income across households. In particular, households supply labor inelastically at a
common post-tax wage rate w¯t = (1 − τt)wt. Nothing of any importance changes
9We will, however, consider the behavior of implied rents, so that the model can address the
behavior of the ratio of house prices to rents.
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if we add idiosyncratic income risk.
Households may only borrow using housing as collateral, as unsecured borrow-
ing is assumed to be unenforceable. We use bt+1 to denote the stock of mortgage
debt acquired at time t, and at+1 to denote the holdings of risk-free assets acquired
at time t. Given the “no unsecured borrowing” assumption, we have bt+1 ≥ 0 and
at+1 ≥ 0 for all time periods. Specifically, households borrow through financial in-
termediaries, modeled as a sequence of one-period mortgage contracts similar to
the treatment in Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013). However, under our assump-
tions below, mortgages will in fact look like adjustable-rate mortgages of stochastic
duration. Asset markets are incomplete, given the lack of insurance with respect
to the idiosyncratic risks. We will use rt to denote the risk-free rate on at+1 and
ρt to denote the mortgage interest rate that depends on the characteristics of the
loan as well as other relevant macroeconomic variables. We assume that interest
payments on the mortgage contracts are enforceable, but repayment of principal
is only backed by the risky housing collateral of the individual borrower.10
We assume that there is no aggregate risk, and two sources of idiosyncratic
uncertainty. One shock is an idiosyncratic i.i.d. “quality” shock xt ≥ 0 to hous-
ing. These quality shocks occur prior to the households’ decisions about consump-
tion, housing, and borrowing, and are distributed across households according to
cumulative distribution function G(x) and density g(x) with support [x, x¯], and
E(x) = 1. They can be thought of as neighborhood affects that result in unpre-
dictable cross-sectional variation in house prices.
The second source of idiosyncratic uncertainty relates to inertial frictions. We
note that households do not freely vary their choice of housing or their financing at
every opportunity. Presumably this is because of some combination of transactions
costs and inattention. In lieu of modeling the micro-foundations of this inertia in
detail, we impose “Calvo-style” adjustment costs: Poisson probabilities of being
allowed to move or to refinance. These have the effect of realistically slowing the
response of households to changes in their environment. Specifically, we assume
that, with probability m ∈ [0, 1], a household becomes a mover (type m). A mover
is free to choose the housing stock ht+1, and can borrow bt+1 against the value of
the new dwelling, subject to the relevant debt constraints which we will clarify
10This assumption is only aesthetic, so that an LTV of one is a natural limit.
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shortly. With probability (1 − m)f , where f ∈ [0, 1], the household becomes a
refinancer (type f). This household cannot move, but is free to adjust its debt
level, subject to borrowing constraints. If a household is neither a mover nor a
refinancer, then it becomes type n, which occurs with probability (1 −m)(1 − f).
These households are stuck with their previous choice of h and b, but must pay
a fraction of at least θ ∈ [0, 1] of the existing debt. That is, if a type n household
enters period t with (ht, bt), it must choose ht+1 = ht and bt+1 ≤ (1− θ)bt.
While this approach to modeling moving and refinancing may appear ad hoc,
we adopt it for tractability, and note that these frictions play very little role, if
any, in our quantitative results on the magnitude of home price inflation. We will
see that with or without these frictions, the magnitude of the price response to
changes in lending standards in our model is virtually identical. The frictions are
crucial only to the extent that they result in realistic dynamics both in prices and
quantities. They enable us to generate more realistic dynamics at the micro level
by introducing frictions that prevent sudden “jumps” in variables of interest as a
response to news or policy changes, similar to the motivation for search frictions.
We should also note that there was considerable geographic variation in the inci-
dence of subprime lending, which suggests that the availability of such loans was
in part due to factors beyond individual borrowers’ control. This provides some
justification for our modeling.
In what follows we distinguish between default and foreclosure. Default is a
simple failure to repay the principle of the loan. It does not by itself trigger any
deadweight losses (such as legal costs) or “moving” (in the sense of the m shock
described above). Foreclosure is a costly legal process that involves the owner
moving in that same sense. We discuss foreclosure costs in more detail, and the
implications of foreclosure versus default from the perspective of the lender, below
in our discussion of financial markets (Section 2.4).
Any household can choose to default. To simplify the analysis—in particular
to make the default decision simple and non-strategic in a sense to be described
below, we make two assumptions about the consequences of default.
Assumption 1 Households cannot move unless they receive the moving shock, even
if they default.
A direct consequence of this assumption together with non-enforceability of
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the repayment of principal, is that a non-mover borrower (type f or n) who de-
faults has his debt level written down to 100% of the value of the house. This
arrangement serves two purposes: The first is empirically motivated, as a frac-
tion of defaults end up in foreclosures in the U.S. Rather, the majority result in
banks accepting a loss on the difference between the sale price of the house and
the remaining principal on the mortgage; our assumption mimics this outcome.
Second, it eliminates the incentive for a “strategic” default decision where, absent
any default costs for the borrowers, an agent might choose to default just for the
opportunity to move or refinance that comes with it.
Note that even with the above assumption in place, a type n household might
choose to default strategically to avoid having to make the required payment θbt.
This motivates the second assumption:
Assumption 2 Type n households are required to pay at least a share θ ∈ [0, 1] of
their debt even if they default.
Under these two assumptions, households default on their mortgages if and
only if they have negative equity.
As to foreclosure, since it almost invariably involves relocation of the former
owner, for simplicity we assume that foreclosure occurs when a defaulter receives
the m shock. With foreclosure, a defaulter cedes the house to the bank in lieu of
repayment of the principal. So to summarize: A default occurs if and only if the
value of the house falls below the value of the principal on the debt. A foreclosure
occurs if a defaulter receives the m shock. This is clearly an simplification: For
example, many defaults result in a voluntary or negotiated sale of the property and
relocation by the former owner. Our assumptions are for the sake of parsimony
and simplicity and have little impact on the main results of the paper.
The timing within a period t is as follows:
1. Households make interest payments on their existing mortgage.
2. Households observe x and their type {m, f, n}, and make default decisions.
3. Given prices, households choose ct, at+1, bt+1, ht+1 subject to the budget
constraint and restrictions imposed by their types. Housing ht+1 can be used
immediately for housing services at time t.
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As mentioned above, our assumptions imply that the household will choose to
default at time t+ 1 if and only if
xt+1Pt+1ht+1 − bt+1 < 0 (2)
This defines a threshold value of shock, zt+1 ≡ bt+1Pt+1ht+1 . If the household draws
a value xt+1 < zt+1 next period, which happens with probability G(zt+1), default
occurs.
Assuming for now that the economy is at a steady state, we drop the time
subscripts from all prices, assuming Pt = P , rt = r, w¯t = w¯, and ρt(.) = ρ(.)
for all t. In equilibrium, due to competition among the financial intermediaries,
and the fact that loan-to-value (LTV) ratio zt+1 alone captures the default risk of a
borrower, the intermediaries will offer mortgages with interest rates that take the
form ρ(zt+1). This will be clarified further in the next few sections when we discuss
the nature of competition in the financial sector. Due to the simple structure of
mortgage loans, we prefer to formulate the budget constraint of a household using
the LTV ratio zt+1 rather than bt+1 by using the transformation bt+1 = Pht+1zt+1.
ct+Pht+1(1−zt+1)+at+1 ≤ w¯+at(1+r)+Pht
(
max{0, xt−zt}−ρ(zt)zt
) ≡ It (3)
ct, ht+1, at+1 ≥ 0, and zt+1 ∈ [0, 1]
ht+1 = htxt for types {f, n}
zt+1 ≤ (1− θ) min{1, zt
xt
} for type n
A household enters period t with after-tax wage w¯, assets at and housing ht
net of the interest payment Phtρ(zt)zt. Having chosen an LTV ratio zt in period
t − 1, upon realization of shock value xt, the household receives a net return (or
capital gain) of Pht max{0, xt − zt} from housing, after taking the optimal default
decision captured by the max operator. Including the wage level and return on
assets, the total resources available to the household, after the default decision, is
represented above by the term It. These resources are spent on consumption ct,
housing ht+1, and assets at+1. A non-mover household is restricted to “choose” the
current housing stock htxt. Moreover, the household can get a loan of Pht+1zt+1
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against the value of current housing Pht+1 by writing a new mortgage contract.
The type of contracts available depends on the household type. In particular, a
type n household is restricted to choose a debt level that is lower than a share
(1 − θ) of the existing debt after taking the default decision, i.e. after the debt is
written down by the lender.
As mentioned, with the frictions we impose on the model, we can interpret the
time period between two moving or refinancing shocks (i.e. remaining a type n
borrower) as the (stochastic) duration of a multi-period mortgage contract. Over
the lifetime of a mortgage contract, the borrower needs to pay at least a constant
share of the debt every period and is subject to an “adjustable rate” based on a
re-evaluation of default probability by the lender.
Although mortgages with LTVs in excess of 100 percent were not unheard of
during the housing boom, these were primarily to cover both the price of the
house and closing costs. For now, our setting with no closing costs simply requires
zt+1 ≤ 1. (Otherwise, the household would default upon receipt of the loan and
pocket the difference between the loan and the value of the house.) Below we will
motivate government intervention in the form of an LTV limit ζ < 1 on conforming
loans.
We now omit time subscripts on choice variables, and use ′ to indicate those
choice variables formerly dated t + 1. The household’s decision problem at the
point of choosing c, h′, z′, a′—that is, after the idiosyncratic shocks have been re-
alized and any default decision has occurred—can be written recursively using its
type i ∈ {m, f, n}, total resources I, housing h, LTV for the existing debt z (after
any write-down by the lender if the household defaulted) as state variables. For
what is to follow let, pim = m, pif = (1−m)f , pin = (1−m)(1− f) represent type
probabilities:
Vi(I, h, z) = max{c,a′,z′,h′}
u(c, h′) + β
∑
j∈{m,f,n}
pijEVj(I ′, h′x′,min{1, z
′
x′
}) (4)
subject to
c+ Ph′(1− z′) + a′ ≤ I
c, a′, h′ ≥ 0, and z′ ∈ [0, 1]
I ′ ≡ I ′(a′, h′, z′) = w¯ + a′(1 + r) + Ph′(max{0, x′ − z′} − ρ(z′)z′)
12
h′ = h for types i ∈ {f, n}
z′ ≤ (1− θ)z for type i = n
2.2 Production
There is a representative firm that uses capital K and labor N , producing con-
sumption and capital goods using a Cobb-Douglas production function. The out-
put of the representative firm is
Y = KαN1−α
For convenience, we also define F (K,N) ≡ KαN1−α − δK, the output net of
depreciation. The firm rents capital at rate r and labor at rate w in competitive
factor markets.
2.3 Government
We now introduce key features of the government’s role in the mortgage market:
First, we posit that the government cannot credibly commit to let large financial
institutions fail, or in the context of this model, incur huge losses-the “Too Big to
Fail” (TBTF) phenomenon. Below we will define “large” in terms of market share
s. Second, as a consequence, financial regulators take measures to limit large insti-
tutions’ risk-taking, which because of TBTF would tend to be excessive.11 Indeed
the key risk-reduction measures that we focus on, which in the model are dis-
tilled down to LTV limits, are those that historically applied particularly to large
protected institutions such as Fannie Mae. The GSEs were long restricted to pur-
chasing only “conforming” mortgages that were limited in size and LTV ratio.12
Other institutions had more flexibility, though for the most part they historically
could not sell non-conforming mortgages to the GSEs. Under our baseline as-
sumptions, the equilibrium involves low default risk and house prices very close
to what their values would be in the absence of TBTF. When the regulations are
11This is not to suggest that small banks are not also regulated in their risk-taking, but that is
largely because of deposit insurance as opposed to discretionary bailouts.
12There have been other requirements as well: Debt to income ratio, credit score, income docu-
mentation, etc., though these appear to have varied over time.
13
relaxed or circumvented, the equilibrium changes to one in which TBTF institu-
tions take over the market. As a consequence, default risk increases, of course,
but our model also implies a large increase in house prices, with no corresponding
change in (implicit) rental prices.
To clarify the notation that follows, for any parameter or variable set by the
government, a bar will indicate its baseline or “normal” value, while a ˆ will in-
dicate its value during the boom. We assume that the initial policy change is
unanticipated, and that once a bailout occurs, it is common knowledge that the
policy will revert to the baseline forever.
We assume that in “normal” times the government, for reasons that we do
not model, wishes to support the housing market, and does so by modestly sub-
sidizing mortgage lending.13 In our simplified setup, in which credit risk derives
only from the idiosyncratic x shock, the distribution of which is assumed to be
identical across all agents and houses, LTV is a sufficient statistic for default risk.
Hence to mitigate the potential moral hazard of excessive risk-taking it suffices
for government to control LTVs. We assume this takes the form of a simple LTV
limit ζ = ζ¯ ∈ (0, 1], so that z ≤ ζ is required for a mortgage to be conforming.
(We will the normal or “baseline” values of policy variables with a bar.) Below
we will show that this policy is in fact effective. The subsidy takes the form of a
government guarantee to the lender of a share η¯ ∈ [0, 1] of any unpaid principal
on a conforming mortgage. 14
The fact that the model contains no reasons for the government’s temptation to
bail out large financial institutions, or for the subsidies to home ownership, does
not mean no such reasons exist. There may be substantial “collateral damage”
from failures of such institutions, and there may be, for example, positive exter-
nalities from home ownership that are missing from the model.15 Our point is not
that these policies are intrinsically bad—indeed in our baseline they are relatively
benign. Rather it is to point out the fragility of the benign outcome, and to il-
13In a world with a choice between home ownership and renting, there may be positive exter-
nalities to ownership that the government wishes to subsidize. The government may also see itself
as helpful in creating markets, as it has for securitized mortgages.
14This can be shown to be equivalent in our model to subsidizing the interest rate on conforming
mortgages, or to underpricing mortgage insurance. We use the “guarantee” language (meaning ex
post replacement of losses) so that η can also serve as the measure of bailouts.
15Others, e.g. Morgenson and Rosner (2011), suggest more sinister motives involving corruption
and cronyism.
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lustrate how modifications to the policies could have a dramatic impact. It is our
contention that enriching the model to motivate the policies would not alter the
main results.
The TBTF aspect of policy works as follows: Let the aggregate default rate on
conforming mortgages be denoted by d, and the baseline or steady state default
rate by d¯. These of course are endogenous, and in particular are functions of
η¯. We assume that in addition to the baseline subsidy η¯ ∈ [0, 1], a government
“bailout” (meaning some ηˆ  η¯ on conforming loans) is triggered for one period,
for any financial institution with s > s∗, in the event that d exceeds some threshold
d∗  d¯.16 We call such an event a “crisis.” After a bailout it is understood that η
reverts to η¯ forever.
We shall see below that as long as the LTV limit on conforming loans ζ is
such that d¯ < d∗, so that in turn η remains at η¯ (i.e. no bailout is triggered),
and provided the modest baseline η¯ is sufficiently to encourage borrowing despite
foreclosure costs,17 then mortgage lending will occur, but the (small) subsidy will
have a negligible impact on the market, and no crisis or bailout occurs in equi-
librium. On the other hand, should the government choose a sufficiently high ζ,
the resulting equilibrium would culminate in a crisis and bailout, the dynamics of
which depend on the inertial friction parameters m and f . Movers would then
borrow up to the now higher LTV limit, and eventually the debt levels and default
risk build up to the point that a crisis and bailout occur. In the absence of the
frictions this would happen immediately when the LTV limits are relaxed.
To finance the subsidy (or the bailout in the event that occurs), government
taxes labor income linearly at rate τ . Since labor supply is inelastic and the house-
holds are identical in terms of their labor endowment, this is effectively a lump-
sum tax equal to τw. We assume that the government runs a balanced budget
each period.
The baseline government policy is thus defined by LTV limit, subsidy, and
bailout threshold parameters {ζ¯ , η¯, s∗, d∗, ηˆ}. In our baseline quantitative exer-
16We assume the government can pre-commit to limit its bailout to conforming loans. This could
be either because the government can prevent institutions from making so many risky loans, or
politically it is feasible to let banks that plunged into non-conforming loans fail.
17Under the quasi-linear preferences we consider below, positive foreclosure costs would mean
that virtually no risky borrowing would occur if η¯ = 0. This is not the case for more standard
convex preferences, where borrowing also serves to share risk.
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cise, we will assume, realistically, that η¯ is high enough to result in widespread
mortgage finance, but low enough to ensure that the aggregate default rate never
exceeds d∗, so that a crisis never occurs in equilibrium. Even so, for the sake
of completeness we allow our definition of competitive equilibrium potentially to
involve a steady-state default rate that exceeds d∗.18 This necessarily involves a
higher LTV limit than in our preferred baseline. In our dynamic analysis we rule
this out, and in fact assume that should ζ for some reason be increased to the
point that a crisis and bailout occurs, the government responds by resetting ζ back
to the lower baseline level.
It should be stressed that we define government policy in terms of LTV limits
simply because in our setting that is the only variable that matters for risk. In this
sense the LTV ratio is just a stand-in for credit risk from any source. If we had
heterogeneity in other borrower or loan characteristics that affected default rates,
policy could regulate those aspects of loans as well to mitigate excessive risk-
taking (given the subsidy and bailout assumptions). For example, if borrowers
varied in their ex ante default probabilities (as captured by FICO scores, say),
which in our model could occur if the x distribution varied across individuals,
then it would be possible for lenders to adhere to a fixed LTV requirement but still
increase risk by extending loans to a wider range of individuals. It is just for the
sake of parsimony that we limit the focus to LTV ratios, but similar results would
obtain for any characteristic that affects credit risk.
2.4 Financial Markets
We assume free entry of financial institutions with positive measure (so that they
can rely on the law of large numbers). These “banks” have constant returns
to scale and in the baseline at least are of indeterminate size. They engage in
Bertrand competition for both their rates for “depositors” and for home mortgage
borrowers. They set mortgage interest rates contract by contract, depending on
the mortgage’s LTV. These assumptions imply that expected profits are zero for
each contract; and with the law of large numbers assumption, banks make zero
profits every period. In this sense, the equilibrium implications are very similar
18In such an equilibrium, the economy would experience a bailout every period, and the station-
ary prices would be consistent with this outcome.
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to those in the model by Chatterjee et al. (2007), where banks are price-taking
Walrasian actors.
Bertrand competition among finitely many banks serves an important purpose,
however, because of the role market share plays in a model of TBTF, it is indispens-
able. As we elaborated in the previous section, the government’s bailout policy is
contingent on two macroeconomic variables: the aggregate default rate, and the
bank’s market share. Non-atomistic profit-maximizing competitors effectively in-
ternalize the impact they have on the aggregate default rate. For instance, our
setup allows a bank to pick a lower interest rate than its competitors for a risky
loan, attract all consumers eligible to borrow, drive the equilibrium default rate
above the government rule, and enjoy the bailout subsidy. In our baseline sce-
nario this will be an off-equilibrium outcome: When the conforming loan limit
is high and any bank can drive the default rate above the bailout rule, all active
banks would take the same action, exhausting all such gains from deviation. It is,
however, precisely these potential off-equilibrium gains that lead to an inevitable
bailout. Observe that if banks were atomistic price takers, in principle, a “good
equilibrium” could be supported despite the high LTV limits, where mortgage in-
terest rates remain high, risky loans are not traded, and default rate remains low,
rationalizing the high mortgage interest rates (due to absence of a bailout).19
Since banks are bailed out only if they are TBTF, i.e. their market share exceeds
s∗, the number of active banks N during the boom period would satisfy 1/N >
s∗. The size of any single institution is indeterminate. Note that the relevant
institutions here are not the originators or mortgages; these could be any size. The
large firms are those that in equilibrium actually hold the mortgages and/or bear
the credit risk. Small institutions such as regional or local banks could originate
the mortgages but then sell them to large institutions.20
Assuming that interest payments are enforceable, a contract between the bank
and the household yields interest payments to the bank with certainty. For a con-
tract with LTV ratio z, the household defaults with probability G(z). We assume
19The action space and payoffs for the dynamic Bertrand game between banks is very sophisti-
cated, and a complete specification of this game is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other
hand, the Nash equilibrium outcome is trivial due to the assumption of risk-neutrality. Motivated
by the latter, we choose to adopt a reduced-form approach focusing on the equilibrium implications
only.
20Small institutions in principle could retain the highest quality, essentially risk-free mortgages.
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that if the property is foreclosed after default, the bank loses a fraction γ ∈ [0, 1]
of the value of the house. We model this cost as dead-weight loss measured in
terms of consumption goods. It is clear that due to foreclosure costs, there are
some gains from renegotiation ex-post. The reasons lenders want to avoid fore-
closures are well-documented in the literature; Ghent and Kudylak (2011) and
Adelino, Gerardi, and Willen (2013) discuss them in detail. First, properties de-
preciate significantly (formalized by γ in the model) when the borrowers are in
default, because the occupants have no incentive to maintain the property.21 Sec-
ond, there are legal and administrative costs. Lenders can eliminate most, if not
all, of these costs by taking alternative actions. For instance, the parties can ne-
gotiate on a short sale agreement in which borrower sells the property at a price
lower than the purchase price, remitting the proceeds to the lender, and the lender
waves the right to a deficiency. Another option is a voluntary conveyance where
the borrower hands over the deed to the property to the lender, and the lender
forgives the debt owed. 22.
Motivated by the empirical evidence that only a faction of defaults results
in foreclosure, for the sake of simplicity we assume that among the defaulters,
lenders foreclose only on those who receive the moving shock. Consequently only
the share m of defaults end up in costly foreclosure. The others cause the bank to
lose the amount by which the home value falls short of the remaining mortgage
principal.
Before we formally define an equilibrium, we characterize mortgage interest
rates in equilibrium. Under our competitive assumptions, the interest rates for
contract x must satisfy the following zero-profit condition derived from the ex-
pected present value of the returns for a financial intermediary, taking the degree
of government intervention, η, and the conforming loan limit ζ into account:
ρ(z; η, ζ)z =
rz + (1− η)
∫ z
x
[z − (1−mγ)x]dG(x) z ≤ ζ
rz +
∫ z
x
[z − (1−mγ)x]dG(x) z > ζ
(5)
21Consistent with this view, Ghent and Kudylak (2011) points out that the common view among
foreclosure attorneys is that if the lenders decide to exercise the option of foreclosure, they have a
strong interest in foreclosing quickly.
22We sidestep the question of why foreclosure ever occurs, given the alternative of a voluntary
liquidation or other arrangement that avoids the deadweight costs of foreclosure. Presumably this
is related to strategic negotiation issues beyond the scope of this paper.
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Note that this expression confirms our earlier claim that the mortgage interest
rate depends only on the LTV ratio z, since it is a sufficient statistic to assess
all risks in a contract from the perspective of a bank. Also note that η = 1 (a
complete guarantee) implies a risk-free borrowing rate independent of the default
probability, i.e. ρ(z; η, ζ) = r for all z ∈ [x, ζ].
We assume that G(.) is continuously differentiable everywhere in (x, x¯), and
that g(x) = G(x) = 0. Using these assumptions, it is easy to show that
1. Function ρ(z; η, ζ)z is continuously differentiable in z ∈ (x, ζ) ∪ (ζ, x¯).
2. limz↓x ρ(z; η, ζ) = r .
3. ρ′(z; η, ζ) > 0 and ρ(z¯; η, ζ) > r hold for all η ∈ (0, 1) and z ∈ (x, x¯).
For the rest of the exposition, unless the effect of a change in parameters is an-
alyzed explicitly, the dependence of ρ on (η, ζ) will be suppressed for notational
simplicity.
2.5 Equilibrium
To investigate the long-run effects of policy on the economy, we proceed with
defining a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium for this environment.
For what is to follow, let S = R+ × R+ × [0, 1] represent the space for total
resources I, housing h, and LTV z. We let Σ represent the Borel σ-algebra on S,
and P represent all probability measures over the measurable space (S,Σ).
Definition 1 A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium with government
policy {ζ¯ , η¯, s∗, d∗, ηˆ} is a set of prices P, r, w ∈ R++, tax rate τ ∈ R+, mort-
gage interest rates ρ : [0, 1] → R++; policy functions ci, a′i, h′i, z′i : S → R+ for
i ∈ {m, f, n}; steady-state distribution µ ∈ P; number of active banks N ≤ N¯ ; de-
fault rate d ∈ [0, 1]; conforming loan limit ζ ∈ [0, 1]; and subsidy η ∈ [0, 1], such
that
1. Given prices, tax rate, government policy, and ζ, policy functions solve the
households’ problem (4).
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2. Given factor prices (r, w), firms maximize profits, therefore
FK(K,N) = r
FN(K,N) = w
3. Given household policy functions, intermediaries maximize profits by choosing
mortgage interest rates, i.e. they satisfy equation (5).
4. The equilibrium default rate d, number of active banks N , subsidy η, and ζ
satisfy
d =
∑
i∈{m,f,n}
∫
G(z′i(.))dµi
N ≤ 1
s∗
if d ≥ d∗
η = (1− 1[d ≥ d∗])η¯ + 1[d ≥ d∗]ηˆ
ζ = ζ¯ if d ≥ d∗
where 1[.] is an indicator function, taking value 1 if the condition in brackets is
true and 0 otherwise.
5. Given policy functions, prices clear all markets:
(a) Labor market
N = 1
(b) Housing market
∑
i∈{m,f,n}
∫
h′i(.)dµi = 1 (6)
(c) Capital market
K ′ =
∑
i∈{m,f,n}
(∫
a′i(.)dµi − P
∫
z′i(.)h
′
i(.)dµi
)
(7)
(d) Goods market
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C +K ′ +DWL = Y + (1− δ)K
where aggregate dead-weight loss DWL equals
DWL = γmP
∑
i∈{m,f,n}
∫
h′i(.)
(∫ z′i(.)
x
xdG
)
dµi
6. The government runs a balanced budget and the tax rate τ satisfies
τwN = ηP
∑
i∈{m,f,n}
∫
h′i(.)
[ ∫ z′i(.)
x
[z′i(.)− (1− γm)x]dG(x)
]
dµi
7. The stationary distribution of households µ is invariant with respect to the
transition function Qi(.) i ∈ {m, f, n} induced by the policy functions.
µi(C) = pii
∑
j∈{m,f,n}
∫
Qj(s, C)dµj(s) for each C ∈ Σ
Our definition allows, for the sake of completeness, a “perpetual bailout” station-
ary equilibrium in which d ≥ d∗ and η = ηˆ. But our baseline will be a stationary
equilibrium in which d < d∗ and η = η¯. This will be the case for ζ¯ sufficiently low.
2.6 Equilibrium under Quasi-Linear Preferences
In this section, to obtain a sharper characterization, we assume that the instanta-
neous utility function is quasi-linear in consumption, i.e. u(c, h) = c+ v(h), where
v(h) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, and satisfies limh↓0 v′(h) = ∞ and
for some h <∞, v′(h) < 1. To rule out the possibility that the non-negativity con-
straint on c is ever binding, we assume that v′(y) < 1. For our quantitative results
we will consider both this case and a limited set of results with more standard
(Cobb-Douglas) preferences, to argue that the quasi-linear specification provides
tractability without significantly affecting the main results.
Under the assumption of quasi-linearity, the choice of LTV ratio and housing
is independent of the wealth level. We make to following observations that follow
from quasi-linearity:
21
• Agents are effectively risk-neutral, therefore only an interest rate r that sat-
isfies β(1 + r) = 1 can be supported in equilibrium. If β(1 + r) > 1, no finite
a can satisfy the Euler equation, and if β(1 + r) < 1, a = 0 must hold, both
of which violate capital market clearing condition.
• Absent any subsidies or foreclosure costs (that is, η = γ = 0), when pre-
sented with the opportunity to borrow, agents are indifferent between choos-
ing any LTV level z ∈ [0, 1]. When a baseline subsidy of η ∈ (0, 1] for con-
forming loans z ≤ ζ is introduced, agents strictly prefer borrowing up to the
limit ζ. By a continuity argument, this is also true when foreclosure costs γ
are positive but small.
• Since the moving and refinancing shocks are i.i.d. and preferences are quasi-
linear, all movers demand the same amount of housing h¯. In addition, since
quality shocks are i.i.d. and E(x) = 1, the expected value of the quality of
housing always equals h¯ between two consecutive moving shocks. Under a
law of large numbers, market clearing for housing implies h¯ = 1 must hold,
i.e. in equilibrium, every mover demands unit housing.
• Again, thanks to the absence of selection, the home price index is indepen-
dent of the distribution of households, and in principle, only depends on
how much a representative mover is willing to pay for housing. This will be
clarified further in the home price calculation below.
In the Appendix, we show that, under the additional assumption that foreclo-
sure costs are positive but small (relative to the baseline subsidy), and imposing
the equilibrium condition β(1+r) = 1, we have the following recursive expression
that holds in equilibrium:
V˜ (h, z) = −Ph(1− z) + v(h) + βPhE(max{x− z, 0} − ρ(.)z)+ β(mV˜ (1, ζ) (8)
+ (1−m)fEV˜ (hx, ζ) + (1−m)(1− f)EV˜ (hx,min{ζ, (1− θ) min{1, z
x
}})
)
where V˜ (h, z) represents the value of holding housing stock h and a debt with LTV
z after housing and LTV decisions are made.23 To derive this expression, we use
23Note that this is in contrast to the value function in expression (4), where value Vi(h, z) is
22
the property that value function (4) is quasi-linear in total resources I, a property
inherited from the quasi-linearity of the instantaneous utility u(c, h′),
2.7 Computing the Home Price Index
Since movers solve the problem maxh′≥0,z′∈[0,1] V˜ (h′, z′) and it is optimal for them
to choose h′ = 1 and z′ = ζ, home price index P must solve ∂V˜ (h
′,z′;P )
∂h′
∣∣
(h′,z′)=(1,ζ) ≡
V˜1(1, ζ;P ) = 0. Differentiating the recursive expression above, we obtain
V˜1(h, z) = −P (1− z) + v′(h) + βPE
(
max{x− z, 0} − ρ(.)z)
+ β
(
(1−m)fE[V˜1(hx, ζ)x] + (1−m)(1− f)E[V˜1(hx,min{ζ, (1− θ) min{1, z
x
}})x]
)
Multiply both sides by h and let W (h, z) ≡ V˜1(h, z)h to obtain
W (h, z) = −Ph(1− z) + v′(h)h+ βPhE(max{x− z, 0} − ρ(.)z) (9)
+ β
(
(1−m)fEW (hx, ζ) + (1−m)(1− f)EW (hx,min{ζ, (1− θ) min{1, z
x
}})
)
Observe that V1(1, ζ) = 0 if and only if W (1, ζ) = 0. This motivates our com-
putational procedure to find the equilibrium price. We solve equation (9) using
recursive methods for W (h, z;P ) and update P until W (1, ζ;P ) = 0 is satisfied.
Finally, while we do not explicitly model a rental market, we can say something
about the implicit rental price for homes. It is apparent that with quasi-linear
preferences, the rental price will be constant at v′(1). Variations in P are entirely
due to changes in expectations regarding the net subsidy η given foreclosure costs,
which gets capitalized into the asset price. Consequently our findings regarding
house prices also characterize the behavior of price/rent ratios.24
defined prior to the decisions on housing.
24With more general preferences the implicit rental price is not literally constant, as the risk-
free interest rate is not constant, but the same principle applies: Movements in the house price
represent variations in expected subsidies, not in rental prices.
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3 Dynamic Analysis: Impact of Relaxing the Conforming Loan
Limit
Having characterized stationary equilibrium, we now undertake a dynamic analy-
sis in which the economy starts at its steady-state, and an unanticipated relaxation
of the conforming loan limit ζ occurs in period zero. This can be thought of as
GSEs purchasing higher-risk mortgages either directly or indirectly, perhaps due
to lax oversight, or government policies aimed at expanding home ownership. We
do not model why the limit is increased, just as we do not model why the govern-
ment is tempted to bail out large financial institutions, but take both propensities
as given. Although the increase in ζ is treated as an ex ante zero-probability ex-
ogenous event, it can easily be generalized to a probabilistic change in a Markov
switching process. Similarly, we assume that with the policy change resulting in a
crisis, the government reverts to the baseline policy with probability one, though
this could be generalized as well.
In order to slow down the adoption of such mortgages, we assume that only
movers are able to obtain them. Although we do not have explicit transactions
costs, the idea is that since they are already obtaining financing for a new house,
it is a natural point at which they could easily obtain a high-LTV mortgage. We
further assume that once someone has obtained a high-LTV mortgage, they con-
tinue to be able to do so when refinancing. In other words, refinancers are able to
get a new conforming mortgage at the same LTV as their original mortgage, or up
to the current conforming limit, whichever is lower.25
Assumption 3 Households become eligible for subsidized high-LTV loans when they
move, and they remain eligible until there is a change in policy.
The role this assumption plays is that even if the high conforming loan limit
presents a systemic risk, a crisis cannot occur immediately unless moving prob-
ability m is very large. Essentially, the measure of agents who are “eligible” for
loans with the new conforming loan limit builds up over time. A critical mass of
these agents must be present for any bank to trigger a bailout.
25The specifics of these frictions are for concreteness and simplicity. What is essential is only that
the opportunity to obtain a high-LTV loan spreads slowly, whether from inertia, lack of awareness,
or lack of availability.
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Many features of the steady state also hold over the transition. For instance,
β(1 + r) = 1 must hold period by period. So does the property that the home
price index is determined by the movers and does not depend on the distribution
of (h, z). This implies, among other things, if agents do not anticipate any further
policy changes in the economy, home price moves to its new steady-state level
immediately in period zero. For our purposes, the more interesting case is one in
which the new conforming loan limit ζˆ is high enough to trigger a bailout some-
time in the future. In this more interesting case, because the bailout is presumed
to be followed by an enforcement of a stricter conforming loan limit ζ¯ (i.e. agents
anticipate a policy change), despite the fact that prices do not depend on distribu-
tion of households, home prices follow a non-trivial path, which must be solved
for explicitly.
To characterize prices over the transition, we use the following recursive ex-
pression Wt(h, z), which is derived from the steady-state version (9). Since only
movers price housing, Wt(h, z) represents the first-order necessary condition for
an eligible household, i.e. a household who moved in some period τ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}.
Wt(h, z) = −Pth(1− z) + v′(h)h+ βPthE
(
max{Pt+1
Pt
x− z, 0} − ρt(.; ηt+1)z
)
(10)
+ β
(
(1−m)fEWt+1(hx, ζt+1)
+ (1−m)(1− f)EWt+1(hx,min{ζt+1, (1− θ) min{1, zPt
xPt+1
}})
)
where ζt denotes the time-specific LTV limit for the conforming loans. In our par-
ticular case, if there is a bailout anticipated in some period T (which is a variable
whose value is determined as part of an equilibrium), ζt = ζˆ for 0 ≤ t < T and
ζt = ζ¯ for t ≥ T must be satisfied where ζˆ > ζ¯ denotes the elevated LTV limit
in place from the onset of the boom. Similarly, since the bailout occurs in period
T , the effective subsidy that is factored into the mortgage interest rate ρt(.) will
depend on the baseline level of guarantees ηt+1 = η¯ for t 6= T − 1, and ρT−1(.) will
depend on the elevated bailout guarantee ηT = ηˆ > η¯.
Just as we did for the steady-state case, to solve for the prices over transition,
we use expression (10). Since prices do not depend on the distribution, the equi-
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librium price drops immediately to the steady-state price for ζ = ζ¯ in the bailout
period T . Denote this steady-state price as P ss. Given Pt+1, price Pt must satisfy
the necessary condition Wt(1, ζt) = 0 since a mover in period t demand h = 1 and
z = ζt. Using the fact that PT = P ss, we can solve for the prices by backward
induction.
3.1 Calibration
To calibrate the friction parameters m and f , we rely on statistics from before the
boom. Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000) find that approximately 50 percent of
mortgages are repaid (either because of moving or refinancing) within 10 years.
Venti and Wise (1989) find that approximately four percent of homeowners move
each year. These facts suggest values of m = 0.04 and f = 0.033. Of course in
reality these hazards, especially the prepayment rates, are not constant or inde-
pendent of duration, but for our purposes the assumption of constant hazard rates
is tractable and seems relatively innocuous. For robustness we also computed the
solution to the model for the case m = 1, i.e. with no moving friction. While
of course there were difference in some dimensions, the price response was very
similar to what we find with m = 0.04.
We set θ, the rate at which non-refinanced mortgages must be paid down each
year, at 0.033, to reflect the typical repayment of principal for a 30-year mortgage.
Of course this rate is not constant for a self-amortizing mortgage, but again the
assumption of a constant rate is made for tractability’s sake.
For its flexibility, we use a Kumaraswamy distribution for the idiosyncratic
shock x. This distribution has 4 parameters: The lower bound x, upper bound
x¯, and two shape parameters a, b > 0), making it effectively as flexible as the Beta
distribution, but with the advantage of having a closed-form density and c.d.f. In
its standard form the c.d.f. Gˆ and density gˆ are
Gˆ (x) = 1− (1− xa)b
gˆ (x) = abxa−1 (1− xa)b−1
for x ∈ [0, 1]. For our purposes we will consider the generalized distribution with
a change of variables so that the support of the distribution is [x, x¯], where 0 ≤x<
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x¯ <∞. 26
For the baseline calibration, we fix x¯ = 1.4 and choose the shape parameters
(a, b, x) jointly to target E(x) = 1, the standard deviation σx and the equilibrium
annual default probability. The literature provides conflicting annual volatility
estimates based on different data sets. OFHEO reported annualized volatility es-
timates quarterly for each state separately between 1996-2000. These estimates
ranged from 0.08 to 0.12. We think that these estimates should be taken as a con-
servative lower bound since aggregate volatility should be higher than regional
volatilities. Flavin and Yamashita (2002) estimate an annual volatility of around
0.15 based on data at the national level, and based on the lack of correlation with
returns on T-Bills, Stocks, and Bonds, argue that this volatility is almost entirely
associated with idiosyncratic risk. This value is also consistent with the estimates
reported by Case and Shiller (1989).27 Based on this evidence, we target an an-
nual volatility of σx = 0.15. While our calibration cannot of course pin down all
of the parameters of the distribution, we choose the parameters values a = 1.329,
b = 2.232, x = 0.743 jointly to match E(x) = 1, σx = 0.15 and a baseline steady
state default rate of d = 0.02. The latter is based on data from the Mortgage
Bankers Association (MBA), which reports quarterly FHA foreclosure starts as a
percentage of outstanding insured loans. This rate was fairly stable around 2%
between 1990 and 2000.28 Jeske, Krueger, and Mitman (2013) also use 2 percent
as their baseline default rate.
As mentioned earlier, researchers have found that the foreclosure “discount”
is about 22 percent. In our model much of this would be explained by selection,
meaning that foreclosed houses are those that have had adverse x shocks. We in-
26This makes the distribution and density functions
G (x) = 1−
(
1−
(
x− x
∆
)a)b
g (x) =
ab
∆
(
x− x
∆
)a−1(
1−
(
x− x
∆
)a)b−1
where ∆ ≡ x¯− x.
27Quoting Case and Shiller (1989), “Individual housing prices are like many individual corporate
stock prices in the large standard deviation of annual percentage change, close to 15 percent a year
for individual housing prices.”
28For details, see the report by Pinto (2011) who compiled these data from MBA sources. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac reported somewhat lower delinquency rates prior to 2005.
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stead base our choice of γ on studies of the direct costs of foreclosures, excluding
those that amount to pure transfers such as the inability of the lender to collect
mortgage payments during the process. For example, Cutts and Merrill (2008)
document costs that suggest these deadweight losses in the vicinity of 3 to 5 per-
cent of the home’s value, so we set γ = 0.03. The model’s predictions are not
sensitive to this choice.
For preferences, in the quasi-linear case with u = c + v(h) we assume v(h) =
h1−µ
1−µ with µ = 2 (though the results are not at all sensitive to this parameter). With
Cobb-Douglas utility we have u(c, h) = c1−ψhψ with ψ = 0.1588 to match average
expenditure shares on housing.
Finally, there is the choice of η¯, the baseline subsidy. It must be large enough
that agents choose to borrow up to the limit, i.e. large enough to offset the disin-
centive to borrow due to the foreclosure cost. A rough idea an upper bound on this
baseline η can be seen from the difference between mortgage rates on conforming
and non-conforming loans, the latter being ineligible for purchase and securiti-
zation by the GSEs. Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess (2005) find a differential
of seven basis points between conforming and non-conforming mortgages, after
controlling for other risk factors, and 4.5 basis points for loans not exceeding 80
percent LTV. In our model, this implies a baseline η¯ of 0.15. Table 1 summarizes
the calibration.
3.2 Results with No Frictions (m = 1)
To understand the magnitude of the price effects, it is illuminating to look at
the case where everyone moves every period. It turns out, in this extreme case,
steady-state price as well as price inflation can be expressed in relatively closed
form.
Assume further that before the increase in the conforming loan limit, ζ = ζ¯.
Using expression (9), W (1, ζ¯) = 0, and letting m = 1, we obtain the following
expression for the steady-state price
P ss(ζ¯) =
v′(1)
(1− ζ¯)− βE(max{x− ζ¯ , 0} − ρ(ζ¯; η¯)ζ¯) (11)
It is easy to verify that in the limiting case of η¯ = γ = 0 this price simply equals
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v′(1)/(1− β).
Suppose as part of an equilibrium, a bailout occurs in period T after the LTV
limits relax to some ζ¯ in period zero. Next we ask the following question: How
much does the price go up right before the bailout? Since price reverts back
immediately to P ss(ζ¯) in period T , we can use expression (9) to compute PT−1.
More specifically we have
PT−1 =
v′(1)
(1− ζˆ)− βE(max{ P ss
PT−1
x− ζˆ , 0} − ρ(PT−1
P ss
ζˆ; ηˆ)ζˆ
)
This expression reflects the fact that a bailout occurs in period T where the effec-
tive subsidy equals η∗. Let pˆ = PT−1
P ss
represent the price “inflation” due to bailout.
Dividing the two expressions above yields an implicit expression in pˆ.
pˆ =
(1− ζ¯)− βE(max{x− ζ¯ , 0} − ρ(ζ¯; ηˆ)ζ¯)
(1− ζˆ)− βE(max{1
pˆ
x− ζˆ , 0} − ρ(pˆζˆ; ηˆ)ζˆ)
This expression becomes even simpler if we assume either η¯ = 0, or that ζ¯ ≤ x.
In this case mortgage lending is riskless. This is a useful benchmark because our
baseline calibration, which features a very low default rate, (in line with the data
from pre-boom era) leads to a very similar steady state. In this extreme case,
imposing the expression (5) for interest rate ρ(.) and simplifying, we can show
that P ss(x) = v
′(1)
1−β and the price inflation satisfies
pˆ = 1 + β
∫ ζˆpˆ
x
[
ζˆ pˆ− (1− ηˆ
ηˆ
γ + 1
)
x
]
dG
Clearly, in equilibrium, the default rate (and foreclosure rate) in the crisis equals
d = G(ζˆ pˆ). Note that for this to be an equilibrium, the default rate must exceed
the threshold value that warrants a bailout, i.e. we must have G(ζˆ pˆ) ≥ d∗. If
G(ζˆ pˆ) ≤ d∗
Observe that when m = 1, either a bailout occurs in period T = 1, one period
after the LTV limit is relaxed, or it never does, depending on the level of ζˆ. The
reason is that the price effect characterized above is independent of time. If,
the time-independent condition G(ζˆ pˆ) ≥ d∗ is satisfied, firms move in period 0,
offer loans at a highly subsidized rate (reflecting the expectation of the bailout),
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drive the aggregate default rate above d∗ (since every consumer can move) and
trigger a bailout, consistent with the initial expectations. On the other hand if
G(ζˆ pˆ) < d∗, no bank (or group of banks) can gain by offering highly subsidized
(η = ηˆ) mortgage interest rates because they cannot drive the default rate above
the threshold rule. In this less interesting case, the steady-state price moves up
permanently in period 0 to the level P ss(ζˆ) and stays there forever.
With no frictions it is feasible also to consider more realistic preferences. Figure
5 depicts the steady state distributions of housing and LTV in the case with Cobb-
Douglas preferences. In this case the convexity of preferences gives rise to a wide
distribution of both variables in the population. This is because the idiosyncratic
shocks to housing value act as permanent wealth shocks, so that each household’s
c and h respond to its history of x shocks. (By contrast, in the quasi-linear case, h
is essentially independent of the shocks and only varies because of frictions.)
Figure 6 depicts the response of the housing price P , the default rate, and LTV
to a relaxation of the LTV limit from 0.8 to 0.99. Because there are no inertial
frictions, everything happens at once: P jumps by about 17 percent, average LTV
jumps from about 0.4 up to 0.99, and the default rate jumps from the low baseline
of about 2 percent up to over 80 percent.
Before adding frictions, we can compare no-frictions results with Cobb-Douglas
and quasi-linear preferences. The point of this is to show that the magnitude of
the price response is similar in both cases, so that when we add frictions and focus
only on the quasi-linear case for tractability, we have some confidence that quasi-
linearity is not playing a crucial role. Figure 7 compares the price response in
the two cases. We see that the response is similar in magnitude, but in the Cobb-
Douglas case the price response exhibits greater volatility, rising higher than under
quasi-linear preferences, and then falling below the steady state level during the
crisis before recovering. Thus if anything our reliance on quasi-linear preferences
in the next section may understate the price impact.
3.3 Results with Frictions
We now add inertial frictions to the model, so that our calibrated quantitative
analysis will yield more realistic dynamics. They are associated with moving or
refinancing, and have the effect of prolonging the boom over many periods, and
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thus postponing the crisis/bailout after conforming loan limits are relaxed.
The upper panel of Figure 8 depicts the steady state distribution of housing
in the model with quasi-linear preferences and inertial frictions. (Note that the
model does not determine a particular distribution of c and a.) The spike at h = 1
represents the choices of movers, while the rest of the distribution results from
the fact that at any point in time 1 − m of households do not move, and their
effective housing evolves over time from the x shocks. The lower panel displays
the distribution of LTV. Again the spike at 0.8 reflects the common choice of both
movers and refinancers to borrow up to the conforming loan limit because of the
modest subsidy. The rest of the distribution is the consequence of the friction that
only 1−m− f of the population can reset their borrowing.
Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 depict the dynamic response of various economic
variables of interest to a relaxation of borrowing standards (an increase in the
conforming limit from 0.8 to 1) at t = 0 under the baseline parameters and various
alternatives: Lower η¯ (0.05 instead of 0.15); lower ηˆ (0.95 versus 1); higher θ
(0.05 versus 0.033); and lower σ (0.12 versus 0.15). It should be noted that
in the absence of any inertial frictions (that is, m = f = 1), the impact of this
relaxation of credit standards would be an immediate jump in the house price of
exactly the peak jump (about 20 percent) in the case with frictions, which would
then immediately precipitate a crisis.
It is worth repeating that in this model the LTV ratio proxies for all risk char-
acteristics, so an increase in the conforming limit is a metaphor for any kind of
relaxation of lending standards. We see that the frictions yield a sustained boom
period because of the slow adjustment of borrowing behavior. The lower right
panel shows that overall average LTV rises only modestly, from approximately
0.55 up to 0.58. This is consistent with the evidence described earlier: While
there were many new mortgages that were very risky (whether in terms of LTV,
FICO scores, or other characteristics), the aggregate ratio did not change dramat-
ically, as increased borrowing was largely accompanied for most of this period by
price appreciation. In the model (and arguably in reality) there were sufficient
numbers of high-risk mortgages to result in a sizeable increase in defaults and
foreclosures, as depicted in the upper right and lower left panels, ultimately to the
point of triggering a crisis.
Of course the primary interest is in the price effect, shown in the upper left
31
panel. The initial impact on price is modest, as the crisis is years away, and only
a small fraction of borrowers takes advantage of the relaxed credit environment.
They pay more for housing primarily because of the larger effective subsidy im-
plied by higher LTV loans, even if η¯ is unchanged for the time being. As this
process continues, however, the price increases accelerate and the accumulating
leverage and default risk drive the economy towards a crisis in which defaults pass
the threshold that induces a bailout.
The ultimate price effect of approximately 20 percent is very robust to a variety
of parameter assumptions. For example, price jumps by approximately the same
20 percent in the frictionless case (m = 1), the only difference being that the jump
occurs immediately upon the change in lending standards, and the crisis occurs
one period later.29
While the welfare impact is not our primary focus, in the model the cost of the
crisis is limited to the increase in foreclosure costs. While these can be substan-
tial, the assumption of a fixed housing stock limits other channels of impact. As
mentioned above, we also do not model any benefits from increased home own-
ership or increased liquidity from relaxation of credit constraints. Of course such
“benefits” from the crisis would be transitory.
4 Conclusion
It is widely believed that a relaxation of lending standards, through a rapid expan-
sion of the subprime market and availability of high-LTV loans, was the dominant
force that paved the way to the financial crisis of 2008. Many observers also cite
“Too Big to Fail” (i.e. the government’s unwillingness to allow large financial insti-
tutions to fail or incur enormous losses) as a factor in those institutions’ increasing
leverage—both their own and those of their clients. The main contribution of this
paper is to directly link these phenomena both to each other and to a quantita-
tively large endogenous boom and bust in house prices and price/rent ratios. That
is, credit limits in our model are not arbitrary frictions, but a welfare-improving
response to the inability of government to allow large financial institutions to fail,
29In our discussion we speak of prices, but the results apply to price/rent ratios as well, since in
the model rents are essentially constant–precisely constant in the quasi-linear case, and changing
very little with Cobb-Douglas preferences.
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and their relaxation has major adverse consequences. This contrasts with many
models in the literature in which credit limits are imposed or removed arbitrarily
and are actually welfare-reducing when in place.
At a normative level, our counterfactual exercise suggests that if the govern-
ment could have pre-committed to allow lenders to fail, relaxed lending standards
would likely have had little impact. Default risk would have been internalized, so
that the higher LTV limits would have been non-binding. That is, the increase in
housing demand would not have occurred in a mortgage market where the bor-
rowing rates accurately reflect the default risk and the costs of foreclosure. By
the same token, the government’s inability to commit to letting these institutions
fail by itself would have been inconsequential had stricter LTV limits (and, more
generally, tighter underwriting standards) been adhered to.
Taking the model more literally, an alternative to the direct supervision of risk
would be a market share limitation on financial institutions, including GSE’s such
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The high-default “bad equilibrium” involves firms
becoming large by undermining credit standards, thereby generating a sort of
“race to the bottom” in credit quality. Size limitations could lead those institu-
tions to plausibly expect a response to aggregate adverse outcomes more like that
seen during the Savings & Loan crisis, when hundreds of small institutions were
allowed to fail, thereby reducing the risk-taking that would lead to such an out-
come.
In short, if the government takes the view that the housing market should be
regulated through a policy that protects too-big-to-fail lenders in the event of a cri-
sis, it is essential that this policy be coupled either with strict controls on leverage
and other sources of credit risk, or with a mechanism that induces proper pricing
of risk, at least for those large firms. With such mechanisms in place, the equilib-
rium that results in a crisis and subsequent bailout is eliminated. Alternatively, a
government that is unable or unwilling to restrict high-risk activities by large in-
stitutions, should either find a way to bind itself not to bail out failing institutions,
or, alternatively, limit the size of institutions in terms of market share.
Our main technical contribution is to illustrate that a model with homogeneous
and rational beliefs can generate asset price movements that appear to deviate
substantially from fundamentals over a number of periods. These deviations are
not “bubbles” in the standard sense of that term. House prices are distorted by
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an implicit subsidy that we presume to be unsustainable, but is responsible for a
boom-bust cycle. These findings provide an alternative (not necessarily mutually
exclusive) to the view that beliefs were irrational or otherwise non-standard and
heterogeneous.
We also find that a boom in house prices can be detrimental to welfare. Since
housing is used as collateral for borrowing, an increase in its price would effec-
tively act to loosen credit constraints in the economy. However, we show that
when these price increases are driven by the market and policy failures depicted
in our model, the distorting effects are potentially large and costly. This prediction
contrasts with some of the literature that suggests, either directly or indirectly, that
there could be “welfare-improving booms” in the real-estate market.
While our analysis captures many characteristics of the mortgage and housing
markets which we believe played an important role in the crisis, we have ab-
stracted from some potentially important aspects of the market. First, aggregate
shocks (aside from the policy shock) would yield a more realistic boom and bust,
insofar as a persistent favorable shock that results in aggregate growth might help
prolong a boom and create realistic uncertainty about the timing of a collapse.
The bust could be triggered by an adverse aggregate shock, thus having uncertain
timing, in contrast to the perfect foresight in our model. Second, we do not allow
for home construction, which might temper the rise in prices but would cause a
bigger decline in house prices after the crash, and potentially increase the welfare
costs of the policy change. Finally, we think it is feasible to add an explicit rental
market, so agents can choose between owning and renting. Extensions along these
lines will make the model more realistic without changing the main message.
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Table 1: Parameter Values-Baseline Calibration
Variable Baseline Value Value in Boom/Target
Policy Variables
Loan-to-Value Limit (ζ) 0.80 1.00
Subsidy/Bailout Rate (η) 0.15 1.00
Fixed Parameters
Discount Rate (β) 0.96 r = 0.04
Default Cost (γ) 0.03 Foreclosure costs 3%
Mortgage Paydown Rate (θ) 0.033 Average on 30-year mortgage
Shock Distribution Parameter (a) 1.33 2% default rate
Shock Distribution Parameter (b) 2.23 E(x) = 1
Shock Distribution Parameter (x) 0.74 σx = 0.15
Shock Distribution Parameter (x¯) 1.4
Moving Hazard (m) 0.04 4% annual homeowner moving rate
Refinancing Hazard (f) 0.033 50% ten-year prepayment rate
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Figure 1: Real Home Price and Building Cost Indicies since 1890.
Note.– This data set is compiled by Robert Shiller and is available online at
http://www.irrationalexuberance.com/index.htm.
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Figure 2: Real Home Price/Rent Index.
Note.– This is the ratio of BLS Owners’ Equivalent Rent of Residences and Case & Shiller Home
Price Index.
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Figure 3: Fannie Mae High-LTV Mortgage Purchases
Source: Department of Housing and Urban Development
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Figure 4: GSE Investments in Private Label Securitizations
Source: OFHEO, Report to Congress, 2008
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Figure 5: Stationary Distribution: Frictionless with Cobb-Douglas Utility
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Figure 6: Dynamic Response: Frictionless with Cobb-Douglas Utility
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
−2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
t
%
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 P
 
 
Cobb−Douglas
Quasi−linear
Figure 7: Price Responses: Cobb-Douglas vs. Quasi-linear Utility
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Figure 8: Steady State Distributions with Frictions in the Quasi-Linear Case
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Figure 9: Dynamic Response: Baseline with Quasi-linear Utility
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Figure 10: Dynamic Response: η¯ = 0.05 vs. Baseline η¯ = 0.15 (dotted)
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Figure 11: Dynamic Response: ηˆ = 0.95 vs. Baseline ηˆ = 1 (dotted)
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Figure 12: Dynamic Response: θ = 0.05 vs. Baseline θ = 0.033 (dotted)
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Figure 13: Dynamic Response: σ = 0.12 vs. Baseline σ = 0.15 (dotted)
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Appendices
A Technical Results on Quasi-Linear Case
For all results that follow, assume that utility function takes the form u(ct, ht+1) =
ct+v(ht+1) where function v(.) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, differentiable,
and satisfies limh↓0 v′(h) =∞.
A.1 Choice of LTV for borrowers
Consider an agent of type i ∈ {m, f}, maximizing objective function (1) subject to
the set of constraints (3). In this section, we demonstrate that this agent borrows
up to the conforming loan limit when subsidy η is sufficiently large compared to
the foreclosure cost γ. For the choice of z ∈ [0, 1], the derivative of the objective
function with respect to zt+1 equals
Pht+1 + βPht+1
∂
∂zt+1
(
E(max{0, xt+1 − zt+1})− ρ(zt+1; η, ζ)zt+1
)
Using expression (5) for ρ(.), differentiating the second expression, and simplify-
ing, we obtain
Pht+1
(
1 + β(−(1 + r)− γmzt+1g(zt+1)(1− η) + ηG(zt+1))
)
zt+1 ≤ ζ
Pht+1
(
1 + β(−(1 + r)− γmzt+1g(zt+1)
)
zt+1 > ζ
Imposing the equilibrium condition β(1 + r) = 1, this simplifies further:Pht+1
(
ηG(zt+1)− (1− η)γmzt+1g(zt+1)
)
zt+1 ≤ ζ
−Pht+1γmzt+1g(zt+1) zt+1 > ζ
Under our assumptions on the pdf and cdf functions g(x) and G(x), we can
make the following observations:
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1. When γ = η = 0, the derivative expressions are identically zero over all
choices of zt+1 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, in this case, agent is indifferent between any
choice of LTV.
2. When γ > 0 and η = 0, these expressions are negative for all zt+1 ∈ (x, 1].
We conclude that in this case, agent does not engage in risky borrowing, and
we can assume without loss of generality, that zt+1 = x.
3. When γ = 0 and η > 0, increasing zt+1 beyond x up to and including ζ
improves the objective, as the derivative is strictly positive. The discontinuity
of the derivative at zt+1 = ζ does not alter the analysis, since the derivative
is negative only for z > ζ. In this case, agent optimally borrows up to the
conforming loan limit, i.e. zt+1 = ζ.
Thus the borrowing decision takes extreme values (corner solutions) that de-
pend on the relative magnitudes of η and γ. Since these functions are continuous
in both of these parameters, these observations suggest that item 3 would still hold
true when η is “large” and γ is “small”. In our numerical analysis, for all cases we
cover, we also verify these results numerically.
A.2 Irrelevance of risk-free assets and labor income for housing and LTV
decisions
In this section, we illustrate that with quasi-linear preferences we can safely ignore
the choice of at+1 and after-tax earnings w¯ for the sake of analyzing housing and
LTV decisions. More specifically, under the equilibrium interest rate that satisfies
β(1 + r) = 1 and quasi-linearity, the objective can be written in such a way that
does not involve the choice of these variables.
Using the constraint (3) to eliminate ct from the objective (1), we obtain the
following equivalent sequential problem
max
ht+1,zt+1,at+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
It − Pht+1(1− zt+1)− at+1 + v(ht+1)
)
subject to
It+1 ≡ It+1(ht+1, zt+1, xt+1, at+1) = w¯+at+1(1+r)+Pht+1
(
max{0, xt+1−zt+1}−ρ(zt+1)zt+1
)
for all t ≥ 0
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ct, ht+1, at+1 ≥ 0, and zt+1 ∈ [0, 1]
ht+1 = htxt for types {f, n}
zt+1 ≤ (1− θ) min{1, zt
xt
} for type n
given I0 > 0, h0 > 0, z0 ≥ 0, x0 ∈ [x, x¯].
Under the assumption that the non-negativity constraints on ct and at+1 never
bind30, we observe that
1. The present value of labor earnings w¯ > 0 enters additively, and therefore
can be omitted without affecting the optimal policies.
2. Since β(1 + r) = 1, all terms involving at+1 for all t ≥ 0 cancel out from the
objective.
3. The expected value EtIt+1 = Pht+1E
(
max{0, xt+1− zt+1}−ρ(zt+1)zt+1
)
, con-
ditional on having chosen (ht+1, zt+1), is independent of the type realization
in t+ 1, where the expectation is taken over xt+1.
Using these results and moving terms across time periods, the objective func-
tion can be simplified further,
max
ht+1,zt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
−Pht+1(1−zt+1)+v(ht+1)+βPht+1
(
max{0, xt+1−zt+1}−ρ(zt+1)zt+1
))
subject to
ct, ht+1 ≥ 0, and zt+1 ∈ [0, 1]
ht+1 = htxt for types {f, n}
zt+1 ≤ (1− θ) min{1, zt
xt
} for type n
given h0 > 0, z0 ≥ 0, x0 ∈ [x, x¯].
A.3 Derivation of the Bellman Equation
A rigorous proof of equivalence of recursive and sequential representation of this
problem is beyond the scope of this paper. However, with standard arguments,
30We conjecture that the non-negativity constraints will not bind provided w¯ is sufficiently large,
and in practice do not observe any cases where they do bind in our simulations.
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one can show that if a solution to the sequential problem in the previous section
exists, than it must satisfy the following recursive version
V˜ (h, z) = −Ph(1− z) + v(h) + βPhE(max{x− z, 0} − ρ(.)z)+ β(mE( max
(h′,z′)∈Γm
V˜ (h′, z′))
+ (1−m)fE(max
z′∈Γf
V˜ (hx, z′)) + (1−m)(1− f)E( max
z′∈Γn(z,x)
V˜ (hx, z′))
)
where Γm ≡ {(h′, z′)|h′ > 0, z′ ∈ [0, 1]} denotes the choice set for a mover, Γf ≡
{z′|z′ ∈ [0, 1]} denotes the choice set for a refinancer, and Γn(x, z) ≡ {z′|z′ ∈
[0, (1 − θ) min{1, z
x
}]} denotes the choice set for other agents. Function V˜ (h, z)
represents the value of the household after shock x is realized, and after default,
as well as (h, z) decisions have been made.
In the first part of this appendix, we have shown that a mover and a refinancer
always borrow up to the conforming loan limit. Moreover, at an equilibrium,
every mover demands h = 1. Now consider a type n agent: When presented with
a choice of LTV limit in z′ ∈ [0, (1 − θ) min{1, z
x
}], this agent would opt for an
LTV limit as high as possible, up to the conforming loan limit for the same reason
as the other types of agents. Hence the choice would satisfy z′ = min{ζ, (1 −
θ) min{1, z
x
}}. Putting all these pieces together, we obtain the value function in
expression (8).
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